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Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald R. Draughon ("Draughon") submits this Reply Brief in 
response to the brief of defendants-appellees Department of Financial Institutions, 
Department of Human Resource Management, Career Service Review Board, G. Edward 
Leary, Karen Suzuki-Okabe and Robert N. White (collectively "State Defendants"). 
ARGUMENT 
This is a straightforward case. Despite the State Defendants' arduous and extended 
efforts to create ambiguities and frame this case as one involving complicated questions of 
statutory interpretation and agency discretion, it can actually be resolved largely by appeal 
to one simple principle of law: "[A]n agency's rules must be consistent with its governing 
statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Utah Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993). Because 
the plain meaning of the term "demote," as used in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) (1996), 
includes reductions in rank, status and responsibilities, even when not accompanied by a 
contemporaneous decrease in salary, the Department of Human Resource Management's 
promulgation of a rule defining "demote" as only those personnel actions involving a current 
reduction in salary is inconsistent with the Department's governing statute. Accordingly, 
Draughon's demotion, even though not accompanied by an immediate salary reduction, was 
a "demotion" within the meaning of the Utah State Personnel Management Act and the 
district court erred in ruling otherwise. 
1 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DRAUGHON'S 
CLAIMS BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT HAD NO DISCRETION TO INTERPRET THE 
UNAMBIGUOUS TERM "DEMOTE" TO EXCLUDE THE ACTION 
TAKEN AGAINST DRAUGHON 
The State Defendants admit that "[generally this Court reviews an agency's statutory 
interpretations for correctness." Brief of Appellees at 13. They nevertheless argue that the 
Court should review the rules at issue here under a reasonableness standard because the 
Department of Human Resource Management (UDHRM") had implicit discretion to construe 
the term "demote" as used in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) to exclude "involuntary 
reassignments" involving reductions in rank or status, but not an immediate reduction in pay. 
This contention is without merit. 
The State Defendants first argue that DHRM has implicit discretion to interpret the 
word demote because the DHRM director has been given authority to "adopt rules for 
personnel management" in Section 67-19-6(l)(d) (1996), and this grant of authority must be 
interpreted to include the power to define terms in the statute. In making this argument the 
State Defendants ignore the very specific and limited grant of rule-making power to the 
DHRM director in the section at issue. Section 67-19-18(3) (1996) only grants the director 
the power "to establish rules governing procedural and documentary requirements" of 
demotions. This more specific and limited power governs rather than the more general 
2 
language cited by the State Defendants. Forbes v. St. Mark's Hospital. 754 P.2d 933, 935 
(Utah 1988).l 
Second, the State Defendants argue that DHRM has discretion to interpret the word 
"demote" because the statute is ambiguous, and there is therefore no discernible legislative 
intent, and traditional rules of statutory interpretation do not resolve the ambiguity. 
However, an examination of the statute in light of relevant authority and principles of 
statutory construction show the meaning of the term "demote" is plain and unambiguous, and 
DHRM has no discretion in interpreting the statute. State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911,912 
(Utah 1974) ("[T]here is nothing to construe where there is no ambiguity in the statute."); 
accord City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County. 925 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1996) 
("Because the statute is unambiguous on its face, no inquiry into the legislative history or 
policy concerns underlying the statute is necessary.").2 
1
 The Legislature quite plainly did not intend the language cited by the State 
defendants to give the DHRM director the kind of all-encompassing discretion asserted. 
Otherwise there would be no need for the many specific grants of rule making power found 
throughout the Personnel Management Act. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-16(3) and 
(4) (1996) and 67-19-34 (1996). 
2
 The defendants' argument that DHRM has general discretion to interpret the term 
because the Personnel Act grants the director authority to "adopt rules for personnel 
management" fails for this additional reason as well. Even if such general and boilerplate 
language in the Personnel Act could be construed to grant the director the authority to adopt 
tendentious interpretations of statutory language, the director would have no such discretion 
here because an unambiguous statute requires no interpretation. 
3 
A term is not ambiguous "'merely because one party assigns a different meaning to 
it in accordance with his or her own interests.'" Dawson v. Dawson. 841 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 
App. 1992) (citing Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty. 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 
App. 1990), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); see also Union Pacific Railroad 
Company v. State Tax Commission. 426 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1967) (court need not consider 
asserted ambiguities that are "merely captious and not serious enough to raise a reasonable 
doubt in a fair mind [reflecting honestly on the subject.") (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). According to the Utah Supreme Court, terms are not ambiguous if they would be 
"'plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and 
reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in light of 
existing circumstances . . .'" LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted). 
The State Defendants' attempts to obfuscate the meaning of the term "demote" as 
used in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) are creative, but unavailing. They insist that it is 
plausible to restrict the definition of demotion to actions involving a current salary decrease. 
But it is clear that a salary reduction is only one way in which an individual can be demoted. 
The plain meaning of "demote" is to "reduce to a lower grade or rank" or "to relegate to a 
less important position." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 302 (1990); see also 
Black's Law Dictionary 432 (6th ed. 1990) ("Demotion. A reduction to lower rank or grade, 
or to lower type of position, or to lower pay scale."). The definition of words in standard 
4 
dictionaries, such as Webster's, and specialized dictionaries, such as Black's, are often cited 
by courts in Utah and elsewhere as a strong indication of the plain meaning of terms. See, 
e.g.. Zoll & Branch v. Asay. 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997) (dictionary used to define 
"separate"); State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am. 771 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1989) (plain 
meaning of term "bona fide" determined as defined in dictionary); Glennon v. School 
Committee of Boston. 378 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (Mass. 1978) ("We derive the words' usual 
and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as 
their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions.") (citation and internal quotation 
omitted). As pointed out in Draughon's opening Brief, a number of courts in other 
jurisdictions have adopted such definitions and held that individuals were "demoted" when 
moved to a lower rank with fewer responsibilities, even though their salaries remained the 
same.3 See Draughon Brief at 10. 
The State Defendants argue that the dictionary definition of demote, to reduce to a 
lower grade or rank, is itself ambiguous because it does not specify what determines an 
3
 This Court need not reach the State Defendants' plausibility argument because the 
term is not ambiguous, and in the absence of ambiguity DHRM has no discretion to define 
the term. But even if the Court were to consider this assertion, it is hard to see how DHRM's 
definition of "demotion" can be plausible or reasonable when it conflicts with DHRM's 
definition of "promotion" as a move from a position in one class to a position in another class 
"having a higher maximum salary range of at least two salary steps." R477-1-1(76), now 
renumbered as R477-1-1(80). Under DHRM's interpretation, moving Draughon from his 
former supervisor position to his current senior examiner position is not demotion, even 
though moving back to his former supervisor position would be a promotion. Such a 
nonsensical interpretation can hardly be considered plausible or "reasonable." 
5 
employee's rank or grade. Brief of Appellees at 17. This is sophistry in a hierarchical 
employment system like the career service system. In the career service system employees 
are assigned to numerical salary ranges, which until recent years were grouped into grades. 
Draughon was moved from a pay range 53 to 68 to a pay range 51 to 66. R. at 88, ^  9 and 
10. Draughon was moved from a supervisory position to a non-supervisory position one 
organizational level below the supervisory position. R. at 107, 133-136, 220. The State 
Defendants do not and cannot seriously contend in this case that it is unclear whether 
Draughon was reduced in grade or rank or that in the career service system, where each 
position is classified and placed on a ladder of positions, it is unclear when any employee is 
reduced in grade or rank. 
The State Defendants argue that DHRM's definition of demotion makes sense as a 
matter of public policy because it gives agencies flexibility in dealing with their workloads. 
State Defendants'1 public policy argument should be made to the Legislature. See, e ^ , Salt 
Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995). ("If 
a statute is infirm, 'amendments to correct the inequities should be made by the legislature 
and not by judicial interpretation.'" (citation omitted); see also Stephens v. Bonneville 
TraveL Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997) (when statute is clear and unambiguous, court 
should "refuse to consider public policy arguments or otherwise attempt to assess the wisdom 
of the legislation."). It is up to the Legislature, and not DHRM or this Court, to balance the 
agency's need for flexibility with the rights of career service employees. A statute cannot 
6 
be interpreted contrary to its plain meaning in the interest of what an agency considers good 
public policy. 
Furthermore, State Defendants' argument that the flexibility provided by the 
involuntary reassignment rule is necessary to the efficient operation of state government is 
disingenuous here. Draughon has never argued that his assignment could not be changed to 
accommodate changes in the industries regulated by the Department of Financial Institutions. 
He has asserted that the level of his assignments and responsibilities, as defined in the class 
specifications for his financial institutions manager position, could not be reduced. 
Draughon's financial institutions manager position was not eliminated. There were five such 
positions both before and after his demotion; their responsibilities were merely reallocated. 
R. at 107, 220. The Department of Financial Institutions has never explained why, when the 
responsibilities of the supervisory positions were reallocated, Draughon was not simply 
moved to one of the newly created or redefined positions. See Brief of Appellees at 8 and 
R. at 115-116.4 
The State Defendants also argue that the fact that the Utah Legislature has amended 
the Personnel Act and Section 67-19-18 creates a presumption that the lawmakers were also 
accepting DHRM's definition of the term "demotion." This argument fails because Utah law 
4
 The State Defendants' assertion that the involuntary reassignment rule does not 
deprive an employee of any "substantial benefit of employment" because his pay is not 
immediately reduced is equally disingenuous. Brief of Appellees at 21. Supervisory 
responsibilities and participation in development of the agency's programs were also 
substantial benefits of Draughon's financial institutions manager position. 
7 
specifically prohibits such a presumption. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-11.5(2)(a) 
(1997), all agency rules in effect on January 1 of any year expire on May 1 of the same year 
unless reauthorized by the Legislature. Moreover, "the Legislature's reauthorization of a 
rule by legislation does not constitute legislative approval of the rule, nor is it admissible in 
any proceeding as evidence of legislative intent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-11.5 (1997) 
(emphasis added). If the Legislature's explicit reauthorization of the administrative rules 
creates no presumption of legislative approval, the reauthorization or amendment of a statute 
cannot create any presumption that the Legislature approves of the administrative agency's 
rules interpreting that statute. Thus, the fact that the Legislature amended Section 67-19-18 
(1996) creates no presumption that DHRM rules interpreting that statute have legislative 
approval. 
Finally, the State Defendants misread the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Sanders 
Brine Shrimp v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993). The State Defendants 
argue that Sanders is inapplicable to the this case because DHRM, unlike the Tax 
Commission in Sanders, had implicit discretion to interpret the statutory language. Brief of 
Appellees at 22.5 In fact, the Sanders court clearly states that an administrative agency has 
no discretion, implicit or explicit, to promulgate rules that conflict with its governing statutes. 
5
 The State Defendants' assertion here is contrary to their acknowledgment at page 14 
of their Brief that the Tax Commission has "discretion in the administration of the tax code 
generally." (citing Putvin v. Utah State Tax Commission, 837 P.2d 589, 590-91 (Utah App. 
1992)). 
8 
"It is a long-standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be 
consistent with its governing statutes." Id at 1306. The clear and unambiguous language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) leaves no discretion for DHRM's interpretation of 
"demotion" to require a current reduction in salary. 
Because the clear and unambiguous language of § 67-19-18(1) shows Draughon was 
demoted, the district court's decision should be reversed, and the case remanded with 
instructions to enter judgment on liability in favor of Draughon on all four of his claims. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DRAUGHON'S 
DUE PROCESS CLAIMS UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Waiver Cannot Be Raised by the State Defendants on Appeal 
Because They Failed to Raise it as an Affirmative Defense in the 
District Court 
In their Brief, the State Defendants argue Draughon waived his constitutional claims 
by failing to raise them in his petition to change DHRM's rules or in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings. Brief of Appellees at 24. This waiver argument, however, was 
itself waived because the State Defendants failed to raise it as an affirmative defense, as 
required by Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). R. at 47-54, 55-61, 62-69. Bezner v. Continental Dry 
Cleaners. Inc.. 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1976). "[T]he matter of waiver is ordinarily an 
affirmative defense which should be pleaded, or the waiver itself is deemed to be waived." 
Id (citing to Rule 8(c)); accord Yellen v. Cooper. 828 F.2d 1471, 1476 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(waiver %'is an affirmative defense which must be affirmatively pleaded."); Stephenson v. 
9 
Davenport Community School District. 110 F.3d 1303, 1306 (8th Cir. 1997) (waiver "'is an 
affirmative defense under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) and must generally be pled or else [it] may be 
deemed waived.'") (citation omitted); Cheryl-Nelson v. Gurley. 673 N.E.2d 497, 500 n.3 
(Ind. App. 1996) (plaintiff who fails to affirmatively plead waiver or raise it at any point to 
the trial court has waived the defense); Kelly v. C.H. Sprague & Sons Co.. 455 A.2d 1302, 
1305 (R.I. 1983) (party who fails to raise waiver at trial level cannot raise it on appeal). This 
is particularly true here where the constitutional claims were fully litigated in the district 
court. R. at 100-103, 144-151, 165-175, 182-187. 
The State Defendants raised the waiver argument for the first time in their appellate 
Brief. Accordingly, this Court should not consider the argument.6 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment Against 
Draughon on His Federal Due Process Claim 
1. Draughon Had a Protected Interest in His Position As 
Financial Institutions Manager 
The State Defendants argue that Draughon has no protected interest in his position as 
financial institutions manager. However, the cases they cite in support of this proposition 
clearly demonstrate that Draughon has such an interest. 
6
 Even if waiver had been plead in the district court, it would not affect Draughon's 
federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because such claims are not subject to 
administrative exhaustion requirements. Patsy v. Board of Regents. 457 U.S. 496, 516 
(T982;>: Hopkins v. Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System. 150 F.3d 1155 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
10 
In Anglemever v. Hamilton County Hospital. 58 F.3d 533, 539-40 (10th Cir. 1995), 
the Tenth Circuit held that a staff nurse had no property interest in quality assurance and risk 
management positions, where the nurse offered no evidence that she would suffer a reduction 
of rank, status or salary caused by her removal from those positions. More importantly the 
court stated specifically that whether removal from a specific position affected a property 
interest was a question of state law, id at 538 n.3: 
It seems clear the analytical structure of procedural due process jurisprudence 
drawn from Roth and Sinderman requires the question of whether a job 
reassignment or demotion implicates a property interest be one of state law. 
In fact, the language from Anglemever cited by defendants emphasizes this point: "[T]he 
overwhelming weight of authority holds that no protected property interest is implicated 
when an employer reassigns or transfers an employee absent a specific statutory provision 
or contract to the contrary." Id at 539 (emphasis added). 
The other case cited by the State Defendants, Stiesberg v. State of California, 80 F.3d 
353 (9th Cir. 1996), is also readily distinguishable. In Stiesberg, a California highway patrol 
trooper claimed that his transfer from his position as commander of the highway patrol's 
North Sacramento Area to commander of its Air Operations Division was a violation of his 
federally protected liberty and property interests, even though the transfer was lateral and did 
not affect his privileges, pay or rank. LdL at 355. The court rejected the claim, noting that 
although there was a California statute that prohibited "punitive" transfers, the transfer could 
not be considered punitive absent some adverse impact on privileges, pay or rank. IcL at 356. 
11 
In this case, unlike Anglemeyer. there is a specific statute — Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-
18(1) (1996) — that provides protection prohibiting demotion except under the circumstances 
set forth in the statute. Moreover, Draughon's "involuntary transfer," as demonstrated in the 
discussion in Section I above, adversely impacted privileges, grade and rank. In short, the 
action taken against Draughon was demotion, not a lateral transfer like the highway patrol 
trooper in Stiesberg. Draughon has a protected property right in his position created by the 
Utah State Personnel Management Act. 
2. The Agency Defendants and Leary, Suzuki-Okabe and 
White in Their Official Capacities May Be Sued Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
The State Defendants argue that the district court properly dismissed Draughon's 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the agency defendants and Leary, Suzuki-Okabe and 
White in their official capacities because they are not ^persons" within the meaning of § 
1983, relying on Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). On the 
contrary, Will specifically holds that, while the agency and individual defendants may not 
be sued for damages in their official capacities, they can be sued under § 1983 for injunctive 
relief, isL at 71 n. 10: 
Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for 
injunctive relief would be a person under § 1983 because ''official-capacity 
actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the Stated 
Kentucky v. Graham. 473 U.S., at 167 n.14, 87 L.Ed 2d 114, 105 S.Ct. 3099. 
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Thus, Draughon's claim for injunctive relief may go forward against the agency 
defendants and the individual defendants in their official capacities, and he can recover his 
attorneys fees against them on that claim. Kentucky v. Graham. 473 U.S. 159, 170 n. 18, 171 
(1985). 
3. Leary, Suzuki-Okabe and White Are Not Protected by 
Qualified Immunity and Are Liable for Depriving Draughon 
of His Position Without Due Process 
The State Defendants argue that Leary, Suzuki-Okabe and White are qualifiedly 
immune from Draughon's due process claim. They acknowledge, however, that officials 
sued in their individual capacities are not shielded by qualified immunity when they violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights because "a reasonably competent public 
official should know the law governing his conduct." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818-819 (1982).7 The record in this case and caselaw existing at the time demonstrate that 
the State officials should have known Draughon's ^'involuntary transfer" was a demotion. 
To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, Draughon had the initial burden to show 
that 1) a constitutional right has been violated and 2) the right was clearly established at the 
time the violation occurred. The burden then shifted back to the State Defendants, as on any 
motion for summary judgment, to prove that there is no issue of material fact and they are 
7
 The qualified immunity defense is unavailable to individual defendants sued for 
injunctive relief in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham. 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Langley v. Adams County, Colo.. 987 F.2d 1473, 
1476 (10th Cir. 1993). 
There is no dispute that Draughon was removed from his financial institution manager 
position and reduced to a financial institution specialist position. Draughon has demonstrated 
this deprived him of his right not to be demoted except for the reasons set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. §67-19-18. 
Moreover, it has been established since Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972), that state statutes and rules create property interests in public employment and that 
an individual cannot be deprived of such interests without due process. As early as 1985 
when the U.S. Supreme Court determined the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 
claims, it catalogued the variety of claims actionable under § 1983 and included both 
"discharge or demotion without procedural due process/' Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 
273 (1985). 
Five years later in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois. 497 U.S. 62 (1990), the U.S. 
Supreme Court made clear that a host of adverse employment actions short of termination 
were actionable under § 1983 as violations of state employees' First Amendment rights, In 
1993 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered § 1983 claims for violation 
of First Amendment and due process rights arising from the demotion of a public employee. 
The court held that after the decision in Rutan the law was clear, and qualified immunity 
would not protect state officials who demoted an employee in violation of First Amendment 
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or due process rights. Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado. 990 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1993). 
Thus, the law was clear at the time of Draughon's demotion that he was entitled to due 
process. 
The process that is due in any particular case depends on the severity of the 
deprivation and the availability of post deprivation process, but includes at the least notice 
of the charges and evidence and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill. 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). In this case, it is undisputed that 
Draughon received no process before he was removed from his position. 
Nor may the individual defendants shield themselves with the challenged Department 
of Human Resource Management rules. If the state statute is clear, a contrary rule provides 
no protection to individuals who violate it. Walters v. Western State Hospital, 864 F.2d 695, 
700 (10th Cir. 1988). This principle is particularly applicable here because it has been clear 
since at least 1993 when Sanders Brine Shrimp was decided that an agency may not limit 
rights granted by statute by narrowing the definition of a statutory term through an 
administrative rule. Draughon has thus established both a violation of his constitutional 
rights and that the law was clear at the time of the violation.8 
8
 Even if Draughon were not able to recover damages for his due process deprivation, 
his declaratory and injunctive claims would not be moot as suggested by State Defendants. 
Brief of Appellees at 31, n. 5. Draughon would still be entitled to declaratory relief that the 
rules at issue are unconstitutional and to injunctive relief restoring him to a financial 
institutions manager position. 
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C. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment Against 
Draughon on His Claim under Article 1, § 7 of the Utah 
Constitution Because He Was Deprived of Property Without Due 
Process 
The State Defendants argue that this Court need not consider Draughon's claim that 
his demotion violated Article 1, § 7 of the Utah Constitution because Draughon did not 
provide an independent analysis under the Utah Constitution. In fact, Draughon did provide 
extensive analysis under the Utah Constitution on the issue of whether Article 1, Section 7 
was self-executing. See Draughon opening Brief, at 19-22. The State Defendants, instead 
of responding to these arguments, merely assert that they did not "shed any light on the 
critical issues of what constitutes 'due process' under the Utah provision, and what specific 
rights are protected under the iife liberty and property' language."9 Brief of Appellees, at 
9
 The State Defendants suggest that Draughon is required to undertake textual and/or 
historical analyses to distinguish Article 1, Section 7 from its federal counterparts in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These approaches, while fruitful in 
other contexts, are of little help in interpreting Article 1, Section 7. Any attempt to cull 
meaning from the text of the Utah provision is problematic because the due process 
provisions of the Utah and United States constitutions are virtually identical. Of course, Utah 
appellate courts are free to interpret the Utah Constitution's due process clause differently 
based on an examination of a unique legislative history, as the Utah Supreme Court did with 
regard to the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in Article 1, Section 9. Bott 
v. DeLand. 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). Here, however, unlike Article 1, Section 9, there is 
virtually no legislative history to draw upon. Article 1, Section 7 passed almost without 
debate; in fact, the discussion of that provision constitutes only two paragraphs in the history 
of the Utah Constitutional Convention. See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional 
Convention, 257 (March 21, 1898). Amicus Curiae Utah Public Employees' Association 
provided additional historical analysis of the due process provision in the context of Article 
16, Section 1, protection of the rights of labor. See Brief of UPEA at 16-19, The State 
Defendants have failed to respond to that analysis. 
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34. However, this remark shows that the State Defendants fundamentally misunderstand 
Draughon's argument, as well as the nature of the questions at issue in this case. 
The question of what constitutes due process under Article 1, Section 7 is not at issue 
in this case because, as Draughon has pointed out and the State Defendants concede, 
Draughon was given no process. See Brief of Appellees at 12, n.3. His "involuntary 
reassignment" was implemented without any of the procedural steps that the State 
Defendants acknowledge would be required if Draughon had been demoted. Thus, the real 
question in this case is not whether Draughon was provided adequate process, but whether 
the action taken against him implicated a property interest, which requires some procedural 
protections. See Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945) (deprivation of a 
property right requires due process under the Utah Constitution). 
As Draughon has demonstrated above, the action taken against him was a demotion. 
A demotion implicates a property interest in employment, which is protected by Article 1, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. As the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed: 
[0]ne may be said to have a special property right in his profession or calling 
by means of which he makes his support, and he can be deprived of it only by 
due process of law. . . . The right to work, the right to engage in gainful 
occupations, the right to receive compensation for one's work are essentially 
property rights [protected by Article 1, Section 7]. 
McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1938); accord Stone v. Department 
ofRegistration, 567 P.2d 1115, 1116-17 (Utah 1977) (u[T]he right to earn one's livelihood 
by rendering a useful service is a property right, which should not be impaired unless there 
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is a compelling public interest which supersedes it and justifies interfering therewith."); 
Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1956) C[T]he right to engage in a profession 
is a property right which is entitled to protection by the law and courts."). 
Because the State Defendants deprived Draughon of a property right in his 
employment in contravention of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on Draughon's fourth claim should be reversed and the 
matter remanded with instructions to enter judgment on liability for Draughon. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's grant of summary judgment should 
be reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Draughon's favor 
on liability on all of his claims. 
DATED this - H U day of October, 1998. 
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